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2-23 加拿大达尔豪斯大学Jing Chen 副教授学术讲座:Compete in Price or Service? – A Study of Personalized Pricing and Money Back Guarantees

题目:Compete in Price or Service? – A Study of Personalized Pricing and Money Back Guarantees
主讲人:Jing Chen 副教授 (加拿大达尔豪斯大学)
时间:2016年2月23日上午10点
地点:主楼6层
主讲人介绍:
    陈静博士现为加拿大达尔豪斯大学Rowe工商12BET运筹及供应链管理系副教授/终身教职,担任国际期刊《International Transaction in Operational Research》(ITOR)和《International Journal of Inventory Research》副主编。在顾客退货、供应链管理和收益管理领域的国际期刊《European Journal of Operational Research》、《OMEGA》、《International Journal of Production Economics》、《Annals of Operations Research》上发学术论文20篇,四篇论文出版在全英文专著中(皆为与本科生合作)。主持加拿大国家自然科学基金项目(2010-2015)和中国国家自然科学基金重点课题一子项目(2014-2018)。
内容介绍:
    Retailers use both pricing and service strategies to respond to intensified competition. Here we develop a duopoly model to investigate the impact of the increasingly popular personalized pricing strategy (PPS) and the widely used Money Back Guarantee (MBG) customer returns policy. We consider two retailers who differ in customer satisfaction rates. Each retailer chooses a pricing strategy, PPS or uniform pricing, and a product return strategy, MBG or ‘no returns.’ We show that both PPS and MBG are dominant strategies, but their impact on retailers’ prices and profits are different; while PPS intensifies price competition and may lead to a “prisoner’s dilemma,” MBG mitigates price competition and may result in a Pareto improvement for the two retailers. Furthermore, when one retailer adopts either PPS or MBG, it will decrease (PPS) or increase (MBG) its own price, but in both cases the other retailer will react by cutting its (average) price. The size of the overall market will increase in both cases. The total customer surplus will increase when the two retailers have comparable customer satisfaction rates, but the total duopoly profit may not increase.

(承办:技术经济与战略管理系,科研与学术交流中心)