报告1：Analysis of Product Rollover Strategies in the Presence of Strategic Customers
报告2：Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium in Mixed Leadership Games with an Application to Cooperative Advertising
主讲人：Sethi Suresh Pal 博士（加拿大皇家科学院院士、杰出教授）
时间： 2014年9月15日10点/2014年9月16日10点
地点：主楼六层会议室
主讲人简介：
    Suresh P. Sethi任教于德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校，现为加拿大皇家科学院院士，Charles & Nancy Davidson运作管理的杰出教授，智能供应网络中心主任(the Center for Intelligent Supply Networks)。Sethi教授在运作管理、营销、工业工程、最优控制等领域做出了杰出贡献，最为人熟知是Sethi advertising model、DNSS Points以及有关最优控制的教科书，如Optimal Control Theory: Applications to Management Science and Economics。Sethi教授在国际主流期刊上发表学术论文264篇，其中Management Science 11篇, Operations Research 17篇, Production and Operations Management 16篇, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 5篇。Sethi教授现为Production and Operations Management协会主席，同时担任Production and Operations Management期刊（UT Dallas 24种顶级期刊之一）的Department Editor，SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization的责任编辑，Automatica的副主编。现担任Management Science、Operations Research(OR)、IIE Transactions(IIE) 、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management等多种权威期刊的审稿专家。
内容简介：
报告1：Frequent product introductions emphasize the importance of product rollover strategies. With single rollover, when a new product is introduced, the old product is phased out from the market. With dual rollover, the old product remains in the market along with the new product. Anticipating the introduction of the new product and the potential markdown of the old product, strategic customers may delay their purchases. We study the interaction between product rollover strategies and strategic customer purchasing behavior and find that single rollover is more valuable when the new product's innovation is low and the number of strategic customers is high. Interestingly and counter to intuition, the firm may have to charge a lower price for the old product as well as receive a lower profit with a higher value disposal (outside) option for the old product under single rollover. Facing a market composed of both strategic and myopic customers, the firm does not necessarily reduce the stocking level as more myopic customers become strategic.
报告2：We study mixed leadership differential games in which a player acts as a leader for some decisions and as a follower for the remaining ones. We partition all decisions into lead and follow-up decisions in the sense that the follow-up decisions are obtained simultaneously as the optimal responses to the lead decisions. Clearly, this involves both Nash and Stackelberg steps. Furthermore, given the optimal responses, the lead decisions are made simultaneously also as a Nash step. Thus, the procedure of finding a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game requires Nash and Stackelberg steps in a nested fashion. We apply the procedure to a cooperative advertising supply chain where the manufacturer and the retailer decide their national and local advertising efforts for selling a product as the follow-up decisions, in response to the participation rates for these efforts provided by the retailer and the manufacturer as their lead decisions, respectively. We discuss the insights obtained from the results. A second application of the procedure to a linear-quadratic game concludes the paper.