题目：Auditing Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Audit Opinions
主讲人：Yinqi Zhang副教授（American University）
时间：2014年6月9日（星期一）上午9:00
地点：主楼216会议室
主讲人简介：
Yinqi Zhang is an Associate Professor in Accounting at the Kogod School of Business of American University. Her main research interest is in the determinants of audit quality and the impacts of regulatory policies on audit quality. Her work has been published in Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, International Journal of Auditing and Review of Accounting and Finance and accepted for publication in Review of Accounting Studies. She has taught introductory and intermediate financial accounting and introductory managerial accounting in the past.
Degrees:
Ph.D., Accounting, Temple University; M.S., Economics, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; B.S., Accounting, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
内容简介：
Two competing views explain the widespread existence of related party transactions (RPTs). Under the efficient contracting perspective, RPTs enable firms to reduce transaction costs and transaction uncertainty and do not necessarily pose additional financial reporting risk. Under the earnings management perspective, RPTs allow managers to conveniently expropriate company resources and/or manage earnings, and consequently increase financial reporting and auditing risk. Using data from the Chinese market where RPTs are particularly prevalent, we examine how the independent auditor responds to the potentially heightened risk of RPTs. We find that firms engaging in RPTs are more likely to receive a modified audit opinion (MAO), and this probability is higher for RPTs with non-market-based or undisclosed pricing policy, for significant RPTs outside the ordinary course of business, and for abnormal RPTs. We also find that a firm’s equity market value decreases with RPTs, but only when it receives a MAO. Taken together, our results suggest that in a low litigation risk environment, auditors resort to MAO to signal the higher risk associated with RPTs, and that the market responds negatively to RPTs when the auditor issues a MAO.