题目：Contract control and buyer–supplier conflicts: The moderating role of market and institutional environments
主讲人：盛仕斌副教授（美国伯明翰阿拉巴马大学）
时间：2014年4月28日 （星期一）下午2:00
地点：主楼216会议室
主讲人简介：
    盛仕斌,美国阿拉巴马大学伯明翰分校市场营销学副教授。1996年本科毕业于清华大学，2004年在美国弗吉尼亚理工大学获市场营销博士学位，后留美任教。盛博士的研究领域集中于营销渠道，品牌战略，新兴经济体的市场营销战略等。盛博士已经在市场营销和管理学的国际主流杂志上发表二十多篇学术论文，包括Journal of Marketing, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Operations Management, International Journal of Research in Marketing, Industrial Marketing Management, Journal of Business Research, Marketing Letters 等杂志。盛博士目前是多家国际学术期刊的编审委员会成员。盛博士曾担任多所大学的访问或兼职教授，包括香港城市大学，香港理工大学，法国Pierre-Mendès大学。盛博士目前是12BET管理与经济学院兼职教授。
内容简介：
Conflicts often occur in the supply chain, and reducing or resolving buyer–supplier conflicts is a pivotal task in supply chain management. However, extant studies find mixed effects of contract control on buyer–supplier conflicts. This study aims to resolve this controversy by introducing agency theory, which distinguishes between output-based and behavior-based contracts. Drawing on institutional theory, we develop a contingent perspective to examine the role of market and institutional factors in moderating the impact of contract control. The findings of an empirical study of buyer–supplier dyads in China show that contract control is both a source of and a resolution to buyer–supplier conflicts. Output-based contracts suppress buyer–supplier conflicts, whereas behavior-based contracts increase conflicts, and both effects depend on the institutional and market environment. Specifically, market uncertainty strengthens the role of output-based contracts in mitigating buyer–supplier conflicts but reduces the positive impact of behavior-based contracts. The positive relationship between behavior-based contracts and buyer–supplier conflicts is further attenuated by an effective legal system but strengthened by strong unilateral government support.