时间：2019年12月27日10:00-11:00

　　地点：主楼429　　

　　报告内容摘要:

　　Existing literature has shown that high degree of product substitutability can drive a duopoly to choose decentralized channel structure (selling products indirectly through an exclusive retailer) in equilibrium. This theory is built on the assumption that each competing manufacturer sells a single product. We examine to what extent this theory still holds when each manufacturer sells two variants of a product category where the market sizes of the two variants may not be equal. We consider two commonly used pricing schemes for branded variants. The first is uniform pricing under which branded variants have the same price. The second is non-uniform pricing under which different variants have different prices. We show that the above theory preserves under uniform pricing. Under non-uniform pricing, however, decentralization can arise as an equilibrium even when one of the branded variants has a low degree of product substitutability as long as the market size of the other variant is relatively large. Thus, a purely decentralized system is more likely to happen with non-uniform pricing than with uniform pricing. We further study the situation with a nonexclusive retailer case. We find that in this case decentralization may arise as an equilibrium when the products are not highly substitutable, as long as the spillover effect is not small.　

　　报告人简介：

　　李雪，北京外国语大学国际商学院讲师。本科毕业于北京航空航天大学经济12BET管理科学与工程专业，博士毕业于清华大学经济12BET管理科学与工程专业。曾于2015年9月至2016年9月赴美国麻省理工学院斯隆商学院进行公派留学访问一年。研究方向为行为运营管理、供应链管理、运营与市场营销交叉等。主持1项国家自然科学青年基金。

　　（承办：管理科学与物流系、科研与学术交流中心）