题   目：Study on the Group-buying auction
主讲人：陈剑教授 清华大学经济12BET
时   间：2011年12月23日(周五) 下午15：30
地   点：主楼241会议室

主讲人简介:
    清华大学经济12BET管理科学与工程系联想讲席教授（Lenovo Chair Professor）、博士生导师，清华大学经济12BET管理科学与工程系系主任, 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地——清华大学现代管理研究中心主任。于1983年获得清华大学电机系学士学位，1986年获得清华大学自动化系硕士学位，1989年获得清华经济12BET博士学位。主要研究领域为供应链管理、电子商务、商务智能与决策分析、系统优化与预测技术等。讲授课程包括动态系统分析与控制、决策理论、运作管理、供应链管理等。
    陈剑教授作为作者/合作者在《Annals of Operations Research》，《IEEE Transaction on System, man and Cybernetics—Part A: systems and human》，《IIE Transactions》，《Information Science》，《International Journal of Production Economics》，《Naval Research Logistics》，《Operations Research Letters》，《Production and Operations Management》，《系统工程理论与实践》、《管理科学学报》等国际国内学术期刊上发表论文一百七十多篇；主持近二十个国家自然科学基金委、教育部、863等国家部委项目，以及近20个地方政府/企业委托项目。应邀在多个国际会议上做大会报告（Keynote/Plenary Lecture）。陈剑教授获得过多项科技奖励及荣誉称号，如教育部科技进步奖/自然科学奖/人文社会科学奖；国际电气和电子工程师协会（IEEE）会士；IBM学院奖；教育部长江学者；复旦管理学奖；全国优秀博士学位论文指导教师；北京市政府科学技术进步奖；中国青年科技奖等。
    陈剑教授在多个学术组织中任职，如担任生产和运营管理学会（POMS）副理事长（负责亚太区），IEEE系统、人与控制论学会服务系统和组织专业委员会主席，IEEE SMC北京分会主席，中国系统工程学会副理事长，中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会副理事长，中国信息协会常务理事，国家自然科学基金会管理科学部专家委员会委员、工商管理组副组长等，也是众多国际会议的主席/共同主席，同时担任多个国际学术杂志（如：Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering、Electronic Commerce Research and Applications、IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics、Flexible Services and Manufacturing、International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making、 Systems Research and Behavioral Science等）的编辑或编委。

内容简介：
    With the development of electronic commerce, online auction plays an important role in the electronic market. The group-buying auction (GBA) is a new kind of dynamic pricing mechanism on the Internet. It makes the bidders as a group through Internet to get the volume discounts, i.e., the more bidders bid, the lower the price of the object being auctioned becomes. In this talk, we first analyze the group-buying auction under some assumptions and build an incomplete information dynamic game model to illustrate the bidders’ bidding process. It proves that for the bidders there exists a weakly dominant strategy S, i.e., no matter when a bidder arrives at the auction and what the bidding history is, the highest permitted bid price that is no greater than his value to the object is always his optimal bid price, but may not be the unique one. Then, we analyze the seller's pricing strategy with the GBA. Based on the bidders' optimal strategy, the sellers' optimal price curve of the GBA in the uniform unit cost case and in some supply chain coordination contracts are explored. We find that the best discount rate is zero, which implies the optimal GBA is equivalent to the optimal fixed pricing mechanism (FPM). Furthermore, we compare the GBA with the FPM in two special cases, the economies of scale and risk-seeking seller, and find that in both cases the GBA outperforms the FPM. The collusion of bidders in traditional auctions is generally forbidden because it is harmful to the interests of sellers. However, we find that collusion in the GBA results in higher bidding, leading to market expansion that benefits both bidders and sellers. Finally, we extend our study to B2B commerce, i.e., consider a supply chain with one supplier and several retailers in their respective independent market, where the supplier offers a new pricing mechanism based on the GBA. An equilibrium is presented.