题目：Price-compatible matching mechanisms for carrier collaboration
主讲人：徐素秀 教授（暨南大学）
时间：2017年5月25日15:00点
地点：主楼216室
主讲人介绍：
徐素秀，博士，暨南大学教授、博导，美国INFORMS会员，美国IISE会员。2008年毕业于哈尔滨工业大学数学系（哈尔滨），获理学学士学位；2011年毕业于哈尔滨工业大学深圳研究生院，获管理学硕士学位；2014年毕业于香港大学工业及制造系统工程系，获哲学博士学位。徐博士曾担任香港大学工业及制造系统工程系博士后兼荣誉助理教授（Honorary Assistant Professor），“运筹学”和“金融工程”本科课程讲师。研究方向主要包括：智能物流服务网络优化、拍卖与机制设计、及运营管理。徐博士联合主持及参与了一系列国家及跨国企业项目，包括：香港RGC GRF项目、P&G SNIC 项目、国家自然科学基金面上项目、及国家自然科学基金青年基金；以第一作者或通讯作者在相关领域发表了11篇A+ / A类国际期刊论文，其中8篇发表在物流运输及运营管理领域A+类国际期刊，如 Production and Operations Management, Transportation Science, Transportation Research Part B, IIE Transactions。自2013年起，论文总被引近150次。
徐教授担任了多个A+ / A类国际期刊的特约审稿人，包括Operations Research、Transportation Research Part B、Transportation Science、Transportation Research Part E、IIE Transactions、Production and Operations Management、International Journal of Production Economics、European Journal of Operational Research、Decision Support Systems等。徐博士担任了国际期刊Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing的特刊编辑，同时还是多个国际会议的大会秘书和分会场主席，包括2015 INFORMS Annual Meeting（分会场主席），The 5th Institute of Industrial Systems Engineers Asian Conference（IISEAsia2016，大会秘书），The 5th POMS-HK International Conference （POMS-HK2014，大会秘书）。
内容介绍：
This study is the first extending the existing market design theory to the field of supply chain and logistics management. It is known that money flow is not allowed in the matching markets like stable marriage, house allocation, and kidney exchange. In this study, we explore the potential of lane exchange among a number of self-interested truckload carriers in a collaboration network (i.e., carrier collaboration ). We consider two cases of money flow in carrier collaboration: (i) a carrier who fails to exchange his lane may join the procurement mechanism as a transportation service purchaser; and (ii) a carrier who fails in lane exchange can always transfer his lane to the platform by making a fixed payment.We propose the (price-compatible) top trading cycles and deals (TTCD) mechanism for case (i) and the price-compatible top trading cycles andchains (PC-TTCC) mechanism for case (ii). Both mechanisms are effective in terms of the compatibility with money flow, strategy-proofness, the realized welfare of carriers, and budget balance. Our experiment simulations show that the PC-TTCC mechanism results in “amazing” cost saving for the collaboration network and (ex post) budget balance for the platform. Especially in the clustered network, our mechanisms can achieve cost saving of 17% for the network, and make 84% of carriers strictly better off. There is no collaboration in the benchmark case. Experimental results also provide some important practical and managerial implications of designing and operating the collaboration network. Overall, this study opens the door to the solutions of a host of price-compatible matching problems.
（承办：管理科学与工程系，科研与学术交流中心）
