时间：12月29日（星期二）上午9:00-10:30

会议号：腾讯会议209 499 242

报告人简介：

Hsing Kenneth Cheng教授是佛罗里达大学John B. Higdon杰出学者、Warrington商学院信息系统和运营管理系系主任。他于1992年获得罗彻斯特大学计算机与信息系统博士学位。郑教授的主要研究方向为互联网技术对软件开发和市场营销的影响分析、信息系统政策问题（特别是关于网络中立性的全国辩论）。基于在前三名信息系统期刊上发表的论文，郑教授在全球信息系统100名研究人员中排名第20位(2009-2011年)和第16位(2010-2012年)。郑教授目前任Decision Sciences副主编， Journal of the Association for Information Systems、Information Systems and electronic Management高级编辑。2011-2014年担任Information Systems Research副主编，曾任职于许多信息系统会议和研讨会的项目委员会，并担任Workshop on E-Business (2003年，2012年)和Taiwan Summer Workshop on Information Management项目联合主席。

报告内容简介：

Sales on the e-commerce platform in the United States have experienced explosive growth and are projected to surpass 740 billion in 2023. The expansion of the platform's traditional role as a platform into an online marketplace and the introduction of its own brand products have stoked a huge fear among the incumbent sellers. The platform's unfair anti- competitive practice further aggravates the situation. Consequently, politicians and regulators have proposed prohibiting platforms from introducing own brand product in order to protect the incumbent sellers. This study addresses two research questions of critical interest to both the policy makers and the incumbent sellers. First, is the platform's introducing its own brand product always detrimental to the incumbent sellers? Second, how effective is the proposed policy in terms of protecting the incumbent sellers? We examine the impact of the platform's own brand introduction on the incumbent sellers under two prevailing sell-on and sell-to pricing contracts. We find that the proposed legislation “that prohibits platforms from both offering a marketplace for commerce and participating in that marketplace” does not have the desired outcome of helping the incumbent sellers. Instead, it forces the platform to adopt only the sell-to contract with own brand introduction that always hurts the sellers. Interestingly, when the own brand introduction is banned under the sell-to contract, the incumbent sellers can be better off because the platform's strategic reaction to the enforcement can lead to the best scenario for the incumbent sellers. If the ban is imposed on both the sell-on and sell-to contracts, the platform's best response is to add another new brand competing with the incumbent sellers, which can also help the incumbent sellers, however, not as much as in the case of the enforcement only under the sell-to contract.

（承办：管理工程系、科研与学术交流中心）